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This project was a cost-benefit analysis of security at Naval Postgraduate School.  
The objective was to determine if the reduction in the probability of a risk of attack 
would be worth the costs.  The product is a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of 
increased security measures at NPS following the September 11th terrorist attacks. 
The present value approach was used as a guide to compare the cost of 
preventative measures against a physical attack and the value of benefits preserved by a 
deterred attack.  Often, cost is simply measured in outlays, while other major cost items 
such as the opportunity cost of time and intangible costs are excluded.  This analysis 
assigned a monetary value to opportunity and intangible costs, in addition to actual 
dollars spent.  Benefits included the replacement cost of buildings and computer 
hardware.  Additionally, the value of life is measured based on marginal values placed on 
marginal reductions in life span.  
The results of this analysis showed that the school is receiving almost negligible 
benefits for the substantial incurred costs to reduce the risk of attack.  This fact is largely 
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A.  BACKGROUND 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. military bases tightened 
security.  The heightened measures included increased ID checks, raising security force 
numbers, and restricted parking and use of certain roads and previously common areas.  
The logic behind the increased security may seem apparent, but what is striking is how 
little analysis has been done on the costs and potential benefits.  This project weighs the 
costs and benefits of security at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California. 
The Security Officer for NPS, Captain Simeral, provided initial data for this 
project and was pivotal in helping the researchers discover and collect the remainder of 
the information.  He derives his authority from the Navy Physical Security instruction1, 
which outlines, in general terms, the standards for basic physical security.  While many 
specifics are not mentioned due to the inherent and obvious differences between bases, 
most are standard throughout the force structure.  The instruction does not discuss 
computer security, nor does it mention information security. 
The chain of command for security at NPS progresses as follows: at the national 
level, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) determines the overall threat to the naval 
fleet, facilities, and personnel; the Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command 
(CFFC) further delineates the setting of Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) and 
Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) to the Regional Commanders; and the Commander, 
Naval Region Southwest, is responsible for ordering NPS into the appropriate security 
posture.  The security posture may be increased at any level, but may never be lowered 
from what the echelon above orders. 
The FPCONs described in the Navy Physical Security instruction are based upon 
the THREATCON in effect at the time and location.  Each THREATCON has an 
associated FPCON to protect against the particular nature and severity of potential attacks 
                                                 
1  Navy Department, Navy Physical Security, OPNAVINST 5530.14C (Washington, DC: 2001). 
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specified in the THREATCON.  The instruction also requires a comprehensive review of 
base security every three years to ensure that local conditions have not changed.  The 
changes could include higher-risk activities that have developed at a base and require 
additional protection, increased threats in the community surrounding the base, or 
previously undiscovered practices that need to be improved.  Likewise, the assessment 
should identify a decrease in previously high-risk activities, or a lower threat level in the 
community that would allow the base to lower or change the focus of security.   
Based on the periodic reviews, each base has Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) that cover the prescribed actions for each FPCON.  Below are listed some of the 
definitions of the FPCONs used at NPS2: 
FPCON NORMAL - A general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but 
warrants only a routine security posture.  FPCON NORMAL is always in effect unless a 
more specific threat or incident warrants the transition to a higher FPCON.  Under 
FPCON NORMAL, expect: 
• Only routine security measures, similar in nature to a civilian campus. 
FPCON ALPHA - A general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel 
and facilities exists, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable.  Circumstances do 
not justify full implementation of FPCON Bravo measures but certain measures from 
higher FPCONs may be necessary based on intelligence reports, or as a deterrent.  NPS 
must be able to maintain this FPCON indefinitely.  Under FPCON ALPHA expect: 
• Delays at installation gates. 
• Tightening of visitor entry procedures. 
FPCON BRAVO - An increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity 
exists.  The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks 
without causing undue hardship affecting operations capability or aggravating relations 
with local authorities.  Under FPCON BRAVO expect: 
 
                                                 
2  Andy Anderson, “Force Protection Conditions,” Navy Postgraduate School Command Security Manager,  12 
November 2002, <http://intranet.nps.navy.mil/security/NPS Force Protection Conditions.htm> [30 November 2003]. 
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• Additional delays at installation gates, possible gate closures. 
• Further tightening of visitor entry procedures. 
• Implementation of a flextime work schedule. 
• Increased internal security and be prepared to comply with instructions. 
• Parking restrictions around facilities away from facilities. 
FPCON CHARLIE - An incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating 
some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent.  
Implementation of this measure for more than a short period has a high probability of 
creating hardship and affecting the peacetime activities of the installation and its 
personnel.  Under FPCON CHARLIE expect: 
• Significant delays at installation gates. 
• Only the minimum number of gates to be open. 
• Tightening of visitor entry procedures, or denial of visitor access. 
• The release of non-essential personnel. 
FPCON DELTA - Implementation applies in the immediate area where a terrorist 
attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that a terrorist action against a 
specific location or person is likely.  Examples include a credible threat communicated to 
NPS officials, or an attempted attack discovered at a local base, based on which it is 
reasonable to assume other attacks may be planned.  For the purpose of force protection, 
the definition of ‘likely’ is purposefully left ambiguous for two reasons.3  The first reason 
is to ensure that going to FPCON DELTA does not reveal to terrorists the specific threat 
being guarded against.  The second reason is to allow leeway for the command to make a 
decision, rather than react from a script that may not cover all eventualities.  Under 
FPCON DELTA expect: 
• The closure of all installation gates to non-emergency personnel. 




                                                 
3  Brian Van Cleef, Special Agent, United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service, telephone conversation 
with author (McCarthy), 26 November 2003. 
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B. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
The various preventive measures have costs and benefits, and economic analysis 
can be used to assign values to these costs and benefits.  The costs are not just the added 
manpower to enforce ID checks, parking, and other restrictions.  The costs also include 
the lost time and convenience that the users of the facility bear in their daily lives.  
Although this second category is often not considered, it is often large. 
CAPT Simeral referred the researchers to the comptroller’s office, the public 
works department, and base engineers to discuss the budgets for base security and the 
valuation of buildings and equipment.  Additionally, Captain Simeral identified the Naval 
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) representative for NPS, Special Agent Brian Van 
Cleef, and the NPS Chief of Police, Robert Baity, for information concerning the threats 
to NPS and measures taken both before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. 
The Naval Postgraduate School Chief of Police identified the threat of a terrorist 
bomb attack as the most severe attack that could be encountered.  While other attacks are 
certainly possible, and more likely (i.e., vandalism, theft), the security measures in place 
will help deter those as well as a bomb attack.  Therefore, the benefits associated with the 
base security are assumed to be the damages that are not incurred by a worst-case 
terrorist bomb attack.  Also, because the project evaluates only the cost of a physical 
attack, information security and cyber-security are not included. 
In developing a worst-case scenario for a terrorist bomb, it was assumed that the 
target would be a building with a high capacity of occupants, at a time when a large 
number of people were present.  This describes several academic buildings on the base.  
To avoid unintentionally assisting any possible future attacks, this project refrains from 
naming specific buildings.  Instead, a standard based on average figures is assigned.  
Thus, the value of the building not destroyed and the value of the lives not taken are the 
two main benefits. 
The calculation of the cost of the security measures takes into account both the 
actual fiscal value of measures implemented (manpower, construction, and procurement 
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costs) and the opportunity costs (value of the time of affected personnel).  Data for the 
valuation of buildings were obtained from the NPS General Engineer/Planner, Allyn 
McGuire.  Additional data, including the contracted cost of security forces, and the 
procurement and construction of additional security measures, were gathered with 
assistance from the NPS Comptroller’s office and NPS Public Works. 
Based on this information, the direct financial impact of the heightened measures 
is low.  While there was a short-term manpower cost associated with the Reserve military 
units that were called into active duty, this activity was used as a short-term fix and is 
regarded as a sunk cost, defined as a cost incurred in the past that does not change in 
response to a present decision.4  Additionally, several construction and procurement 
projects were associated with base security.  Many of these projects were scheduled for 
the near future and, in fact, were not originally intended for security reasons; rather, 
added security was an unintended benefit of the projects.  Therefore, these projects also 
have minimal effect on the cost of security. 
The opportunity cost to the students, faculty, and staff is the single most 
significant factor, however.  There is an extra amount of time spent at the gates, driving 
the circuitous route around the base, and walking from parking that is a greater distance 
from the buildings.  This time does not directly cost the government anything, but it is a 
cost borne by those individuals it affects. 
For example, at the on-base speed limit of twenty miles per hour, an average 
driver will spend a total of over a minute of extra driving time coming on the base.  
Because the parking spaces within eighty feet of buildings are now restricted, the person 
will then walk thirteen extra seconds to cover that ground (four miles per hour for eighty 
feet).  Thus, for every time a person comes to and subsequently leaves the base, there is 
about two and a half minutes of extra time spent traveling.  Multiplied by the daily 
number of people that come on base and the number of days they come to the base, the 
total additional time spent traveling is upwards of 25,000 man-hours or the equivalent of 
greater than a dozen full-time employees.  This example does not even include the added 
                                                 
4  Marc Lieberman and Robert E. Hall, Introduction to Economics, (Cincinnati: South-Western, 2000), 124. 
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delays at gates during peak hours; however, it illustrates the substantial loss of time that 
must now be translated in financial terms.  Using a realistic average salary for the 
population that works and studies at NPS, the total cost of this time is over one million 
dollars per year. 
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II. PHYSICAL SECURITY AND RISK ANALYSIS 
A. PHYSICAL SECURITY 
Security at NPS is the responsibility of all service members and employed 
civilians.  A police department is required only if the population exceeds 500 military and 
civilian personnel.  This department fills the role of provider of physical security and law 
enforcement.  The primary responsibilities include: detection, deterrence, and defeat of 
terrorism; prevention and deterrence of theft and other losses; protection of life and 
property; and enforcement of rules, regulations, and statutes.5  The stated mission of the 
NPS Police Department is: to provide quality customer oriented force protection, 
physical security, law enforcement and emergency management services to our 
customers so they may enjoy a safe and secure living, working and learning 
environment.6 
In an effort to gain insight to any significant changes in the role of base security, 
our team interviewed Chief Baity, head of NPS base police.  Chief Baity has been serving 
in this role for nearly six years.  The most interesting fact that came out of the interview 
was that he perceived an increased ability to accomplish his department’s mission, rather 
than an alteration in security focus.  Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
enforcement of a strict security policy appeared to be deemed less important than 
maintaining a relatively open campus environment.  Following the attacks, NPS security 
became an increased priority of the administration.  Heightened measures quickly 
resembled those typically associated with a military base.  The increased recognition of 
this need is seen by Chief Baity as a major asset to him and his team in their attempt to 
meet the increased security requirements.7 
                                                 
5  Ken Bench, “Police Department Duties and Responsibilities,” Law Enforcement Training, 3 July 2001, 
<http://www.nps.navy.mil/police/phase_training/lesson_101.doc> [30 November 2003]. 
6  T. Burton, “Mission,” Naval Postgraduate School Base Police Department Mission, Vision and Guiding 
Principles, < http://www.nps.navy.mil/police/mission.htm> [30 November 2003]. 
7  Robert Baity, Chief of Police, Naval Postgraduate School, interview by authors, 31 October 2003, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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Three major efforts currently exist for the NPS security force to increase physical 
security: Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS), Electronic Identification 
System (EIDS), and increased manpower.  DBIDS is a program devised to improve 
physical security through ensuring the authentication, control, and accountability of 
individuals with access to U.S. military installations.  The system uses the latest bar code 
scanning technologies in the registration of personnel, vehicles, weapons, and guests.  
The plan features a remote, wireless scanning device to aid gate security forces to 
determine the identity and access privileges of persons attempting to access a base.8 
EIDS is similar to DBIDS but is centered on contractors and vendors at NPS.  
Companies supporting NPS, whether through supplying cleaning equipment and 
chemicals or soft drink vendors, are subjected to vehicle searches that consume both the 
delivery individual’s time and that of the gate guard.  This system would rely on thorough 
background checks of drivers and the civilian company maintaining vehicles sanitized 
from threats.  Alleviating the need for screening at entry gates, the precious commodity 
of time is saved.  The value of EIDS has been judged to be great enough that civilian 
companies have agreed to pay for the system’s implementation.  But the cost should be 
considered because the companies will price this cost into their bids for a government 
contract.  
Manpower is considered a major shortcoming for security at NPS.  For nearly a 
year and a half after September 11, the security force was augmented by reserves to meet 
the stringent requirements.  Base security has maintained a civilian workforce of fourteen 
for at least four years before 9/11 to the present.  Despite budgeting for an increased 
security force of twenty-one and a CNO validation report recommending forty-two, there 
has been no increase in funding to support new hiring.9  CAPT Simeral stated that NPS is 
strengthening active duty security by increasing the number of Masters-at-Arms (MA) to 
                                                 
8  Bill Rhine, “Frequently Asked Questions,” BIDS Information, 28 October 2003, 
<http://www.nps.navy.mil/bids/BIDSFAQ.htm> [30 November 2003]. 
9  Baity. 
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nineteen.  Until that goal is reached, gate security personnel will be subsidized with 
enlisted staff of various ratings assigned to various departments at NPS.10 
In addition to these three ongoing endeavors, a crime prevention program assists 
the police department in reducing criminal opportunities, protecting potential victims, and 
preventing property loss.  Crime prevention is defined as the anticipation, recognition, 
and appraisal of a crime risk and the measures used to reduce or remove that risk.  
Additionally, efforts are made to raise the general awareness of personal and command 
security concerns.  These goals are achieved through awareness briefings, publicity 
campaigns, and patrol by walking around (PBWA).  Although the focus of these 
programs primarily relates to criminal activities such as theft, assault, rape, robbery, and 
burglary, the reduction in the risk of a terrorist attack is another definite benefit.11 
B. RISK ANALYSIS 
With a general understanding of Force Protection and Physical Security and some 
specific implications for NPS, a risk analysis for the area is required.  For this data, 
Special Agent Brian Van Cleef of NCIS was interviewed.  Special Agent Van Cleef, who 
has been assigned to NPS for approximately one year, provided a Local Threat 
Assessment for Naval Postgraduate School.  The report states that no current information 
indicates the targeting of NPS for a terrorist attack, despite the Defense Intelligence 
Agency setting the terrorist threat level for the United States as significant. 
Combined with the facts that several suspects of the September 11 attacks 
traveled through the San Diego area, certain reporting speculates that major attractions in 
Southern California may have been considered.  However, no terrorist activity has been 
identified in the vicinity of Monterey.  Although the port of Monterey is only a few miles 
from NPS, the port handles no large commercial or cargo vessels.  The deep-water ports 
of San Francisco or Port Hueneme present a more attractive target due to their strategic 
and economic significance.  Additionally, the report states that there is no developed 
                                                 
10  Robert Simeral, Security Officer, Naval Postgraduate School, interview by authors, 2 October 2003, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
11  Ken Bench, “Crime Prevention Programs,”  Law Enforcement Training, 3 July 2001, 
<http://www.nps.navy.mil/police/phase_training/lesson% 114.doc> [30 November 2003]. 
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information indicating an imminent threat from terrorist organizations employing 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
Local law enforcement states that no specific individual, organization, or criminal 
enterprise has demonstrated intent to target Department of Defense (DoD) members in 
the greater Monterey area.  The primary criminal threat to DoD personnel is inadvertent 
involvement in a street crime.  More specifically, ongoing gang activity around the city of 
Salinas has led to NPS encouragement of command personnel to take several preventive 
measures: using the buddy system, stopping one’s automobile for only easily identifiable 
police vehicles, and carrying limited amounts of cash and jewelry.  Finally, the Foreign 
Intelligence Service Threat (FIST) has been measured as moderate due to the 
combination of Research and Development projects at NPS and the large number of 
foreign national students hosted at NPS and the Defense Language Institute (DLI).12 
Chief Baity concurred with the NCIS assessment.  He reported that the most 
likely criminal activity at NPS would be theft--more specifically, computer theft.  Both 
he and Special Agent Van Cleef maintain that the well-trained and equipped security 
force at NPS, in addition to the complete perimeter fence and controlled points of entry, 
helps reduce an already minimal risk of a physical terrorist attack.  However, Chief Baity 
contends that, although unlikely, the worst-case scenario of a physical security lapse 
would be a bomb attack against an academic building.13  For this reason, close 
cooperation is preserved with local, state, and federal agencies for the reporting and 
exchange of threat information.14 
 
                                                 
12  Brian Van Cleef, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Local Threat Assessment For NPS, (Naval 
Postgraduate School, CA: 11 July 2003). 
13  Baity. 
14  Van Cleef, Local Threat Assessment For NPS. 
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III. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS MODEL 
The cost-benefit analysis model selected for our research is the basic model used 
by virtually all economists who do cost/benefit analysis.  A particularly clear statement of 
the principles can be found in Dr. Harvey S. Rosen’s textbook, Public Finance.  Dr. 
Rosen earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Michigan and his Ph.D. 
from Harvard University.  He has served as both a member and chairman of Princeton’s 
Department of Economics since 1974.  Dr. Rosen’s main field of research is public 
finance and he is currently on hiatus from Princeton at the Council of Economic Advisers 
in Washington, D.C.15 
Cost-benefit analysis is a tool that establishes practical procedures to assist in the 
direction of public spending decisions.  Any project or policy results in the increase and 
decrease of scarce resources; however, since governments do not typically operate in a 
well-functioning market, officials must rely on a cost-benefit analysis to establish the 
values of gained and lost commodities and determine if the bottom line of the overall 
project is beneficial.16   
Executive Order 12866, developed by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), states: (I)n choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should 
select those approaches that maximize net benefits … Each agency shall assess both the 
costs and benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and 
benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.  However, a 
structured analysis, in the format of a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), is required only 
for “economically significant” regulations.  “Economically significant” is defined as 
likely to “have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely 
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, 
                                                 
15  “Biography,” Harvey S. Rosen, <http://www.princeton.edu/~hsr/bio.html> [30 November 2003]. 
16  Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance, 6th edition, (McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2001), 220. 
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jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or state, local, or tribal governments or 
communities.”17  Despite this measure being limited to “major” rulings as described in 
the Congressional Review Act, it establishes a governmental framework for using a cost-
benefit analysis in decision-making. 
There are several ways in which a cost-benefit analysis can be approached: 
internal rate of return (IRR), benefit-cost ratio, and present value criterion.  IRR ( )ρ  is 
based on a project’s costs (C) and benefits (B) over a set number of time periods (T) in 
the following equation: 
 ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2 T T
0 0 2 T
B C B C B CB C ... ... 0
1 1 1ρ ρ ρ
− − −− + + + + =+ + +  
Criteria to accept a project is if ρ  exceeds the opportunity cost of funds.  
Selection between two projects is based on a comparison of the projects’ ρ .  However, 
IRR yields poor guidance when deciding between two projects of varying size. 
Benefit-Cost Ratio assumes a project produces a stream of costs and benefits.  
Taking the present value of both and establishing a ratio defines the benefit-cost ratio. 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
0 2 T
B B BB B ... ...
1 r 1 r 1 r
= + + ++ + +
T  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
0 2 T
C C CC C ... ...
1 r 1 r 1 r
= + + ++ + +
T
                                                
 
Benefit-Cost Ratio =  B/C 
To be considered, a project must yield a ratio greater than one.  A decision 
between two or more projects is based on the highest ratio figure.  Unfortunately, there is 
an inherent ambiguity when determining benefits and costs, in that benefits can be 
assigned as “negative costs” and vice versa.  Therefore, arbitrary decisions concerning 
the assignment of costs and benefits will adjust the ratio value, rendering this method 
useless in comparing projects. 
 
17  President, Executive Order, "Regulatory Planning and Review," Federal Register 58, no. 190 (4 October 
1993), 12866, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo12866.pdf> [30 November 2003]. 
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It is concluded that both internal rate of return and benefit-cost ratio are poor 
methods of choice for a cost-benefit analysis.  The present value criterion used to 
evaluate a project is defined by two guiding principles.  First, the admissibility of a 
project (is it worth doing?) is affirmed by a positive present value.  Second, the choice 
between two mutually exclusive projects is decided by the higher present value.   
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
0 2 T
R R RPV R ... ...
1 r 1 r 1 r
= + + ++ + +
T
                                                
 
From this equation, it is evident that the invalid ratio shifts associated with the 
benefit-cost ratio are not a factor because the present value criterion is based on the 
difference between benefits and costs.  Also, the varying scales of projects do not 
invalidate the present value criterion as it does with IRR.18 
Figure 1 shows the real rates used for discounting real (constant-dollar) flows as 
published by OMB.19  A discount rate (r) is used because a single dollar today, regardless 
of inflation, is worth less in the future.  Discounting this dollar is based on the interest 













Figure 1.   Real Interest Rates on Treasury Notes and Bonds of Specified Maturities 
(in percent) 
 
Before these guidelines were implemented in 1993, a 10 percent real rate of return 
was used.  The researchers use each rate and compare the results. 
Our analysis compares the cost of the incremental increase in security since the 
September 11 terrorist attacks to the additional benefits gained from that security 
increase.  The figures for costs and benefits are based on a terrorist bomb attack against 
 
18  Rosen, 226. 
19  “Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs,” Office of Management and 
Budget Circular Number A-94, 31 January 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a94.html> [30 
November 2003]. 
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an academic building.  Although some security costs produce additional benefits by 
preventing other crimes, such as theft, the focus of this paper is on the worst-case attack 
scenario. 
B. ATTACK SCENARIO 
With an established blueprint for a cost-benefit analysis, it is necessary to 
estimate the magnitude of a specific attack.  This is the first step to begin calculations of 
the benefits of increased security that are in place to prevent such an attack.  For the 
purposes of this project, the worst-case scenario is a truck bomb parked adjacent to, or 
driven into, an occupied building. 
The bomb used in the Oklahoma City Federal Building is the basis for this 
analysis for several reasons.  First, there is more available and accurate information about 
this attack than exists in other cases.  Second, the building is similar in construction, size, 
and occupancy.  Third, the bomb used is widely available and could have been used in a 
similar attack on NPS with little or no hindrance from security prior to September 11, 
2001. 
On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma was bombed, causing extensive damage to the structure, the loss of 168 lives, 
hundreds of non-fatal injuries, and substantial property damage in the vicinity.20  The 
cause was identified as a bomb consisting of 4,800 pounds of ammonium nitrate, 
transported to the location in a rental truck and parked in front of the building.21 
The Murrah Federal Building was a concrete structure approximately 220 feet 
long, 90 feet wide and nine stories tall, with large open spaces for offices.  In comparison, 
the academic building in question is 250 feet long, 110 feet wide, and three stories tall 
with large open spaces for offices and classrooms.  Though the height of the building 
may seem like an obvious difference, the footprint of the building is similar.  The 
Oklahoma City bomb blast created a crater along the length of the building, reaching 
                                                 
20  “Chapter I Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building,” Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma 
City and Beyond, 19 April 2001, <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/respterrorism/chap1.html> [30 
November 2003]. 
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21  Benton K. Partin, “Bomb Damage Analysis of Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building,” 30 July 1995, 
<http://www.intellex.com/~rigs/page1/okc/report.htm> [30 November 2003]. 
deep into the structure.  The crater would have been even larger had the truck been 
detonated near the center of the building rather than the corner.  This crater was on the 
lower floors, causing the upper floors above the damaged area to collapse.  Hence, the 
footprint of the building is more important for determining the proportional damage. 
When the catastrophe occurred, roughly 600 federal and contract workers and 250 
visitors were in the building.22  This means that almost twenty percent of the occupants 
were killed in the blast.  Based on the reasonable occupancy of the examined NPS 
academic building being one-third that of the Murrah Federal Building and one-third the 
height, a similar blast should create a proportional loss of life.  Because the footprint of 
the Murrah Federal Building was only 72 percent the size of the academic building being 
examined, a crater the same size will destroy less of the academic building.  Therefore, a 
reasonable estimate is that the casualty rate in the academic building would be 72 percent 
of the casualty rate in the federal building.  The fatality rate in the Oklahoma City attack 
was 19.8 percent; therefore, the fatality rate in the academic building is expected to be 
14.2 percent. 
The damage in the Oklahoma City bombing was not limited to the one building.  
The explosion damaged an additional 324 surrounding buildings, countless cars, and 
other property in a 50-block radius.23  This damage is not well defined or documented 
enough to estimate a value with any accuracy.  The setting of the Murrah Building 
downtown in a metropolitan area is not comparable to that of the relatively open NPS 
base and residential neighborhoods.  Although the inevitable collateral damage is not 
quantified in this project, it certainly would exist but would be proportionally smaller 
than in the Oklahoma City case. 
C. BENEFITS 
As discussed in the Attack Scenario Section above, there would be obvious 
damage from a successful attack.  Preventing an attack prevents the associated damage 
                                                 
22  “Chapter I Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.” 
23  Ibid. 
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from occurring.  Damage that does not occur does not result in economic loss.  Therefore, 
the benefits of security are equal to the economic loss not experienced. 
The areas that need to be examined are the physical damage, the loss of life, and 
loss of intellectual property.  The physical damage includes the building and its contents.  
As described above, collateral damage is not quantified in this project, though some 
would certainly exist.  Also, there would be resources used that would be unavailable 
elsewhere for the duration of the rescue effort, such as rescue vehicles, medical supplies, 
and manpower.  Because of the degree of uncertainty that the resources would be needed 
for another event, this is not quantified. 
The loss of life includes the lives lost as a direct result of the attack.  Not included 
are injuries, pain and suffering, and other related issues.  While these may occur, they are 
also not predictable enough to be quantified with accuracy. 
Finally, the intellectual property that is contained within the building can be 
estimated.  There are hundreds of computers in the building, including larger servers for 
the NPS Local Area Network (LAN).  While many people save data on the hard drives of 
their computers, it is assumed that most work is backed up to the LAN or that the 
individuals have back-ups at a site outside the building.  The LAN servers that are located 
in the building are backed up routinely and the back-ups are stored in different locations 
to prevent loss to physical attacks.24  Therefore, no significant loss of intellectual 
property is quantified for this project. 
1. Physical Damage 
The bulk of the physical damage would be the damage to the building.  While 
there may not be complete destruction of the building, it is relatively certain that the 
building would be demolished and rebuilt rather than repaired.  For this reason the 
original construction cost of the building was not used.  The cost of demolishing and 
removing the existing structure, combined with the cost of replacing the building with a 
similar structure, is more reasonable. 
                                                 
24  Bob Gentry, Director, Information Technology Operations Center, Naval Postgraduate School, interview by 
author, 24 November 2003, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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The current replacement value of the building is $17.7 million.1  This includes the 
teardown and removal of the old structure, rebuilding the structure, and re-wiring all 
electrical, LAN, and telephone lines.  Lockers, blackboards, and other installed 
equipment are also considered part of the building replacement value.  A reasonable 
estimate of the physical contents of the building includes computers and related 
equipment (projection equipment, printers, copiers, etc.), books and supplies, desks and 
chairs. 
The current estimated replacement value of the computers and related equipment 
is $7,021,600.  The total figure for all computer user hardware is $336,100, including 
desktop computers, laptop computers, and printers.  The value of miscellaneous 
equipment (projectors, copiers, etc.) totaled $85,500.  The 60 LAN servers cost a total of 
$1,500,000.  Finally, the Uninterruptible Power Supply costs $100,000 and the 
mainframe hardware costs $5,000,000.2 
The replacement cost for other physical equipment in the offices and classrooms 
is estimated at $100 per office desk (classroom desks are installed equipment), $25 per 
chair, and $500 worth of books per office.  Office and classroom furniture total $104,700. 
Unfortunately, there is a portion that is not accurately estimable.  In this case, 
there would be a large amount of labor in installing a new computer network.  Even 
though parts of it would be rebuilt with the new building, the network would need to be 
temporarily set up elsewhere because of the integrated nature of the network at NPS.  
After the building is repaired, the workstation configuration would also take time.  It is 
difficult to estimate a value to place on the labor, because the set up of a computer 
network can encounter a large number of time consuming obstacles, or almost no 
obstacles at all. 
As shown in Appendix A, the total value of the contents of the building is 
$7,126,300.  The total replacement value of benefits from property not having to be 
repaired or replaced is estimated to be $24.9 million, including the building. 
 
                                                 
1  Allyn McGuire, General Engineer, Naval Postgraduate School, interview with authors, 23 October 2003, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
2  Bob Gentry. 
2. The Value of Life 
There are several methods of valuing human life.  There is the obvious trade 
value, which any rational person would set at infinity for himself, making it a useless 
number for analysis.  A popular method is to determine the future income flow that a 
person would generate based on current salary, age, and several other factors.  This 
approach is also flawed.  Take a sixty-five-year-old retiree, for example.  Since the retiree 
neither works nor generates income, his or her value would be absolutely nothing. 
The preferred method of valuing a human life is by measuring the marginal values 
people assign to marginal reductions in life span.  When people knowingly engage in 
risky behavior for some gain, then that gain is worth more to them than the risk of losing 
their life.  For example, a person has a choice between two similar occupations, one with 
a low fatality rate and low pay or a job with a high fatality rate and high pay.  If he 
chooses the higher risk for the higher pay, then the analyst can impute the value to him of 
a change in the probability of losing his life.  This imputed value can then be used to 
estimate what economists call “the value of a statistical life.”  The value of a statistical 
life, therefore, is not really the value of a life.  But it is the relevant measure to use in 
estimating the value of increased safety because increased safety does not save the lives 
of specific people whose identities are known in advance, but, instead reduces the 
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a. Fatality Rate Comparison 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes an annual report containing the 
number of work related deaths by profession, including the military.  The historical 
figures are available through 2001.  Deaths related to the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks are not included because they were not considered work-related deaths; rather, 
they were classified as the result of acts of war.  Additionally, there is no historical data 
on the number of workers by profession before 2001.  Prior to this year, one can 
determine how many firemen died in a given year, but not how many firemen there were 
total that year.  So while fatality numbers can be shown for a specific profession, fatality 
rates can be determined only for the entire civilian population.  But for 2001, data shows 
how many workers were in each field and how many workers were in each category 
(middle management, specific manual labor descriptions, etc.). 
The number of deaths per 100,000 civilian workers was determined for the 
years 1992-2001, and then averaged.  Likewise, the most recent year for middle 
management (equivalent to a military member at the O-3 pay grade) was calculated.  The 
2001 data for middle management was slightly higher, but well within the range of the 
ten years of general work force data.  Thus, it is assumed that while the long-term death 
rate for middle managers is not available, it is reasonable to use the 2001 data for this 
project.  Thus the civilian fatality rate used for comparison in this project is 5.24 deaths 
per 100,000 full-time workers.27 
The number of military deaths from the same ten-year period is available 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (again, not including the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attack fatalities).  The number of military personnel during those years was determined 
                                                 
27  “Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, <http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm> 
[24 October 2003]. 
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from the Department of Defense website.28  A fatality rate for the entire military 
population was then generated, 7.46 deaths per 100,000 active duty personnel.29 
Unfortunately, no data is available on the number of military deaths by 
either job description or rank.  There is no reason to believe that the fatality rate in the 
military is different between rank or pay grades; however, certain jobs may be more 
dangerous (special forces vs. administrative assistants).  Because all jobs are represented 
in the fatality data and in the NPS population, the data should be reasonably accurate. 
The numbers of deaths per 100,000 workers for the years 1992-2001 was 
compared for the military and civilian workers.  The military death rate for that period 
was approximately 7.46 deaths per 100,000 workers, while the civilian death rate was 
5.24 deaths per 100,000.  This equals a difference of 2.22 deaths per 100,000, or a 
.00222-percentage-point higher risk for military managers than their civilian equivalent. 
b. Pay Comparison 
A military member is paid more than his civilian equivalent to undertake a 
more dangerous job, just as a welder will make significantly more money for work on the 
fortieth story of a construction site than on the ground floor. 
For the analysis of the pay data for civilians and military members, year 
2002 data was used.  This is one year after the last year that the data was provided for the 
fatality rates.  Because the people choosing jobs would look at the historical data, it is 
reasonable that 2002 pay rates account for the risk of the previous ten years.  Since this 
project looks at personnel currently at NPS, they would most likely have signed on for 
the additional duty in 2002.  Also, this is the last year that data is available for the civilian 
earnings in middle management.  When the final number for the value of life is reached, 
it is in 2002 dollars.  That value is then adjusted forward to 2003 dollars using the 
inflation rate for 2002. 
                                                 
28  “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels,” Military Personnel Statistics, 
<http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms9.pdf> [24 October 2003]. 
29  “Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries.” 
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The average student at NPS was determined to be in the O-3 pay grade 
(Naval Lieutenant, or a Captain in the Army, Air Force or Marines) with eight years of 
active duty service and at least one dependent.  While many people get special pay or 
allowances in the forms of proficiency pay and specialty bonuses, these were not 
included in the analysis.  Only pay and allowances that all members receive were 
included in the analysis, at 2002 rates.  Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), Basic 
Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), and Basic Pay were included.  BAH varies depending 
on the cost of civilian housing in the region where the member is stationed.  An average 
2002 BAH for an O-3 is $13,065 per year, based upon an un-weighted average of all 
BAH rates.  Basic Pay and BAS do not vary between members; they were $48,841 and 
$1,996 per year, respectively.  The total for an O-3 was $63,902 in 2002.30 
The pay for the average civilian middle manager was the 2001 rate given 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.31  The average rate was given for the entire United 
States regardless of locality or industry.  The average pay rate of $26.87 per hour was 
multiplied by a 40-hour week and 52 weeks per year for an annual earning of $55,890. 
The difference in earnings between a middle manager in the military (O-3) 
and an average middle manager in American society is $8,013.  This number reflects only 
monetary compensation.  Bonuses for both civilians and military members are ignored, as 
are military retirement and medical benefits, and any other fringe benefits. 
c. Comparison of Pay Difference with Increased Risk 
The difference in risk from 1992-2001 was 2.22 deaths per 100,000 
workers (.00222 percentage points higher for the military).  The trend was very steady for 
the ten years evaluated; therefore, the difference in risk for the current year should be the 
same.  The difference in pay was $8,013 in 2002, or $8,240 higher in the military in 2003 
when adjusted for the national inflation rate of 2.83 percent in the United States. 
                                                 
30  “2002 Military Pay,” Defense Finance and Accounting Service Military Pay Prior Rates, 23 October 2003, 
<http://www.dfas.mil/money/milpay/priorpay/01-2002.pdf> [30 November 2003]. 
31  “Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics Survey,” Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, <http://data.bls.gov> [24 October 2003]. 
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In order to determine the value one places on his or her own life, the 
marginal increase in earnings must be divided by the corresponding marginal increase in 
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Thus, the average Value of Life for our standard O-3 in this project is 
$3,711,515. 
Note that, although many assumptions had to be made to compute this 
number and although the data used to compute it were gross data rather than the fine 
individual data typically used by labor economists to compute the value of a statistical 
life, this number is close to the typical finding of about $5 million for the value of a 
statistical life. 
d. Number of Lives Lost 
For the building in question, there are numerous classrooms and offices.  
The maximum use of the classrooms is ten at a time.  Assuming that approximately 25 
seats are occupied per class, 250 students can be expected in the building at peak usage.  
This does not include students who are not in class, for example, those in the lounge or 
working in a computer lab. 
About 138 faculty and staff work in the building.  Assuming that half of 
them are present at peak usage, the total increases by another 69 people, making the total 
number of people present in the building 319. 
The population density of the building is roughly the same as the Federal 
Building in the Oklahoma City terrorist attack, as described in the section detailing the 
nature of the attack.  Thus, 14.23 percent fatalities are expected, as was the case in that 
attack.  This means that 45 people would lose their life in the attack 
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3. Total Benefit 
Valuing the lives of the 45 people at $3.7 million each, the economic value of the 
loss of life would be $167 million.  Combined with the property damage of $24 million, 
the total is $192 million in property not damaged and lives not lost. 
D. PREVENTION 
The major preventative measures associated with post 9/11 security at NPS are 
greater limitation and control of access to base entry.  The number one step in 
accomplishing this feat was gate closures.  Prior to 9/11, there were four main gates open 
at NPS.  Since the attacks, gate access has been limited to one primary gate, and during 
peak hours a second gate is opened.  Increased manning at access points has been another 
measure implemented to strengthen security.  The future implementation of DBIDS will 
assist gate guards in their further efforts to limit base access to authorized individuals.  
These efforts are designed to thwart plans before any destructive missions are conducted 
on base.32 
If base access is gained, parking restrictions around buildings are intended to 
reduce the likelihood or damage associated with a bombing.  A vacant car in a restricted 
area will more likely raise suspicion than if it is parked among other vehicles.  Therefore, 
if left within eighty feet of a building, a car bomb is more likely to be discovered.  If 
camouflaged among other cars outside the restricted building perimeter, the damage to 
the intended target (an academic building) will be greatly reduced.  Despite the seemingly 
obvious benefits of increased security, there are associated costs that may not be so 
apparent. 
The counter to this thinking argues that unless the parking restriction is strictly 
enforced, it actually raises the risk to property and lives.  Presently, construction and 
contractor crews are allowed to park within the 80-foot perimeter; therefore, most people 
assume any vehicles within the restricted area belong to these companies.  If security is 
alerted, and there is no obvious reason to suspect anything other than a parking violation, 
a ticket is simply issued.  Another opposing point is the parked cars present an obstacle to 
                                                 
32  Robert Baity. 
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a suicide bomber’s attempt to drive a car bomb into the building.  Based on these 
arguments, the parking restriction is an ineffective security measure and actually raises 
the risk. 
E. COSTS 
Three major areas largely encompass the breakdown of costs associated with 
increased security at NPS: fiscal, opportunity, and intangible.  From a private sector 
perspective, costs are simply monetary outlays for required inputs based on market 
prices.33  However, relative to the increased security at NPS, this approach would neglect 
the most substantial expenditures, social costs--more specifically, opportunity and 
intangible costs.  Alternative methods for measuring each type of cost attempt to include 
these externalities, by-products of a good or activity that affect individuals not directly 
involved in the original action.34 
1. Fiscal Costs 
Analysis of actual fiscal costs was focused on the NPS base police force.  These 
costs were divided into three categories.  First, non-labor costs include standard supplies, 
maintenance, and training.  Next, contract costs are associated with the leased security 
vehicles.  Finally, labor costs are the sum of salaries for the fourteen individuals 
employed as base police.  Additionally, attention was given to counter terrorism allocated 
during FY02 and FY03. 
Active duty personnel assigned to security at NPS were not factored into the 
analysis.  For nearly eighteen months following the September 11 attacks, reserve forces 
augmented security at NPS to ensure the increased demands were met.  This action was a 
temporary fix and, as stated in Chapter One, is a sunk cost.  NPS does incur cost with the 
future addition of 19 Master-at-Arms.  Assuming the productivity of each individual is 
equal to his pay, the cost is the individual’s annual salary.  Based on the average salary of 
second-class petty officer at the ten-year mark, each individual adds a cost of $45,000, 
for an annual total of $855,000. 
                                                 
33  Rosen, 230. 
34  Lieberman and Hall, 281. 
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Appendix B shows the cost of NPS base police from FY00 to FY04.  Due to 
changes in budget record keeping, the FY00 bottom line is the only available number 
with no associated breakdown.  Although the number of personnel has remained constant 
at fourteen, variations in labor cost are the result of overtime pay, cost of living increases, 
and a special salary rate for base police.  There has been no incremental increase in labor 
cost stemming from the heightened security.  Significant increases in the non-labor and 
contract sections of the budget for FY02 and FY03 are the result of a counter terrorism 
expenditure, designed to improve the overall security.  However, many of the purchased 
items listed in Appendix C had no bearing on physical security, but were directed toward 
IT security.  Additionally, the funded physical security measures, highlighted in yellow 
on Appendix C, had already been committed to.  The counter terrorism funding merely 
accelerated the process.  In fact, we have found no increased budgetary commitments into 
the future due to actions taken in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
2. Opportunity Costs 
Opportunity cost is defined as “the cost of making an investment that is the 
difference between the return on one investment and the return on an alternative.”35  In 
the case of time, the opportunity cost is the value of the next best use of that time.  One 
good measure of that is a person’s wage.  If a person earns twenty dollars per hour, the 
next best use of his or her time must be worth less; otherwise it is assumed he or she 
would undertake the other alternative. 
For a person to spend extra time in traffic, he or she gives something up, possibly 
an extra few minutes at work.  Over the course of a year, the few daily minutes in traffic 
may total a large amount of time.  If one values that time at the same rate as the person’s 
wage, then that is the opportunity cost of that person sitting in traffic. 
While this is a good measure, it can be argued that the extra minutes may not have 
been used at work.  The person could use that time for a leisure activity instead, such as a 
last cup of coffee at home with the family every day, during which he or she would not 
be paid.  By that reasoning a person’s time would be worth nothing.  In reality, if that 
                                                 
35  “Opportunity Cost,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary> [28 November 
2003]. 
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person were asked to work above his or her normal time at work, he or she would be paid 
extra, overtime.  Thus, a person’s leisure time may be worth more than his or her working 
wage rate.  For this reason, the more conservative average yearly wage is used in this 
project. 
Given the numbers of personnel that commute daily to and from the base, and 
their average annual earnings, it is possible to find the Weighted Average Annual 
Earnings of commuters on the base (Appendix D).  Assuming a 240-day work year, at 
eight hours per day, the Weighted Average Hourly Earnings would be $41.24 per hour.  
For all calculations it was assumed that everyone commutes to and from the base once 
per day, 240 days per year. 
The opportunity cost rate of people’s time was applied primarily in three areas: 
extra time lost waiting at the gate, the extra time it takes to drive around the perimeter of 
the base, and the extra time it takes to walk from parking spaces eighty feet further away. 
By the estimate of Chief Baity, the time spent waiting at the gates during peak 
hours is seven to eight minutes.  This is the combined effect of greater congestion at 
access points due to gate closures and increased security and identification checks not 
conducted prior to September 11, 2001.  This entire amount of time is an increase over 
the original baseline.  However, it does not affect everyone.  Some personnel do not 
arrive or depart at the peak hours.  We use a conservative estimate that only half the NPS 
population arrives during these peak times.  Therefore, the seven-minute wait applies to 
only 1,320 of the commuters, as shown in Appendix F.  Seven minutes per day for 240 
days equals 28 hours, multiplied by 1,320 people at $41.24 per hour equates to 
$1,524,409 per year in opportunity costs. 
Extra time spent driving includes the longer route that people must follow from 
the gate to their normal parking areas.  This is longer because the gates that many people 
previously used are now closed, and they must drive further to reach the gate and parking 
area.  It was assumed that the increased distance affected half of the commuters because 
the gate originally used was still open or the new gate was the same distance from the 
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parking lot.  Only the increased distance inside the base was calculated, because people 
are arriving from or departing to any number of locations. 
The perimeter road that must be followed from the Tenth Street gate to the 
furthest parking area is 4,000 feet further than from the Del Monte gate, and must be 
traveled twice--once arriving and once departing.  The base speed limit is 20 miles per 
hour, at which speed it takes an extra 136 seconds each way.  This equates to 18.2 hours 
per person each year for 1,320 people.  At $41.24 per hour that is $989,976 in 
opportunity costs. 
Appendix E outlines the recently lost and gained parking spaces.  Although 
parking spaces within eighty feet of buildings have been restricted to common use, newly 
created spaces have offset the total loss to a mere 53 spaces, or 2.7 percent.  There is now 
a necessity for every commuter to walk an extra eighty feet, since the parking spaces 
nearest the buildings have been closed.  Initially, this loss appears to affect only people 
who park in the first eighty feet, but the cumulative effect as they park farther away is 
that everyone has the extra eighty feet. 
The average human walks at three miles per hour.36  This means the extra eighty 
feet takes the average commuter 18 seconds each way, or 2.4 hours per year.  Because the 
parking issue affects all personnel on base, the annual increase is multiplied by 2,640 
people at $41.24 per hour.  The resulting opportunity cost is $263,967. 
Combining the opportunity cost of gate delays, increased driving distance, and 
lost parking, the total equals $2,778,251.27 (Appendix F).  This sum is the equivalent of 
280 full time employees at the average earnings rate.  This time is obviously a cost, but 
the government seldom considers it.  The cost to the government is indirect and long 
term.  With the marginal increase in time spent, the level of job satisfaction and moral 
will also decrease marginally.  This can hurt retention and cost the government more 
money in the long run. 
 
                                                 
36  “Measuring Outcomes,” Polio Bracing, <http://www.polio-bracing.com/pages/measuringoutcomes.html> [28 
November 2003]. 
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3. Intangible Costs 
Finally comes the task of addressing intangibles.  We have identified two 
intangible commodities: public opinion and “think-tank time (intellectual capital).”  
These costs are impossible to value, and three points must be considered when intangible 
items are considered important.  First, inflating or underestimating the value of 
intangibles can pervert the entire cost-benefit analysis.  Claiming that increased security 
at NPS has destroyed public relations with the local community, while valuing public 
relations at an exorbitant $1 billion, for example, would distort the entire equation.  
Second, calculating the difference between measurable costs and benefits can force 
limitations in valuing intangibles.  For example, if the measurable benefits of increased 
security at NPS exceeded costs by $50 million, the question then becomes whether the 
costs of lost public opinion and “think-tank time” are really worth $50 million.  Lastly, 
although certain intangibles may be impossible to value, a cost-effectiveness analysis of 
various alternatives may allow the valuing of other options. 
In our case, we related public opinion to specific interaction between NPS and the 
community to determine if there had been a consequential decrease in public opinion.  
Our primary concentration was on the Labor Day “Concert on the Lawn,” which was 
reinstituted for the first time since base security was increased.  It had previously been a 
long-standing tradition that had opened NPS to the public to enjoy an afternoon of music 
from groups ranging from the Monterey Bay Symphony Association’s Monterey Pops 
Orchestra to the DLI Navy Choir.  With a returning crowd of approximately 1500, and no 
incidents, we concluded that there has been little, if any, cost incurred due to loss of 
public opinion.37  Special Agent Van Cleef’s assessment concurs that NPS has 
historically enjoyed excellent relations with the local community, and residents tend to be 
extremely pro-Navy.38 
Another intangible that needed to be addressed was the “think-tank time.”  
Although we were unable to value this cost, it is a relevant factor.  Through the process 
                                                 
37  Kevin Howe, “Labor Day Symphony Returns to NPS,” The Monterey County Herald, 30 August 2003, 
<http://www.montereyherald.com/mld/montereyherald/news/local/6655881.htm> [30 November 2003]. 
38  Brian Van Cleef. 
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of our research, several professors have commented that the delays and parking costs 
resulting from increased security have curbed their efforts to venture on base.  
Specifically, certain individuals stated that if they had no class or other scheduled 
obligation, they would perform other necessary duties at home.  Initially, there actually 
seems to be a decrease in opportunity costs and all direct academic activities are still 
accomplished.  But as many professors will attest to, a great deal of academic stimulation 
occurs during interaction between professors.  This activity may generate future research 
theories or resolve ongoing questions in various fields.  We have labeled this lost 
brainstorming process as “think-tank time.”  Determining the amount of unexplored ideas 
and then assigning a cost of the lost research dollars or possible increased reputation to 
the school is undeterminable; however, it does remain a cost that needs to be addressed. 
4. Total Cost 
So, while there are intangible costs, only fiscal costs and opportunity costs 
incurred on the faculty, staff, and students of NPS are valued.  Therefore, the total annual 
cost is $3.63 million.  Taking the Net Present Value of $3.63 million over the next five 
years at a 1.9 percent discount rate (see Figure 1) equals $17.16 million.  Using a 10 
percent real rate, the Net Present Value equals $13.76 million.  Opportunity and increased 
manpower costs are continual through the years, and the researchers assume that risk and 
current security measures will be in effect for the next five years.  Attempting to assess 
the changes in risk and corresponding reaction in security measures past this time frame 
is beyond the scope of this project. 
F. RISK 
Determination of risk at NPS proved to be a task of accumulating a list of other 
comparable targets.  Although terrorist actions are typically attempts to attack political 
authority, victims tend to be overwhelmingly innocent civilians.  This targeting strategy 
is based on vulnerability and more dramatic consequences.  Therefore, both possible 
civilian and military targets within the borders of the United States were accounted for.  
Terrorist attacks are aimed at undermining a population’s faith in the ability of the 
government to protect civilians and infrastructure or maintain peaceful conditions in 
society.  These effects are gained by targeting a multitude of sites: government buildings, 
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military bases, airplanes and airports, trains, bridges, tunnels, banks, economic centers 
and major businesses, symbolic public monuments, civilian gatherings and congested 
population centers, power plants, water supplies and pipelines, communication centers, 
and computer networks.  Appendix G lists targets comparable with academic buildings at 
NPS. 
For the purpose of this analysis, it was assumed that each of the 317,385 targets 
shared an equal likelihood to be attacked.  This approach was deemed the most 
conservative due to the inability to assess any terrorist capabilities and motivations.  
Having established the total number of possible targets, the Department of Homeland 
Security Advisory System was reviewed to determine the risk of an attack within the 
United States.  The current Elevated Condition (yellow) declares there is a significant risk 
of terrorist attacks; however, there is no publicly quantifiable figure associated with this 
condition.  Noting that it is positioned as the center of five possible settings, we assigned 
a 50 percent risk.39  This valuation is supported by recent studies that place the United 
States in the top four countries worldwide most likely to be targeted by terrorists.40 
These two figures combined equate to a 1.576x10-6 chance of being attacked.  
This is the risk of one attack, in a given year.  Beyond the 9/11 attacks, current events 
throughout the world have illustrated the increased capabilities of terrorist to conduct 
coordinated attacks.  If four targets were attacked, as on September 11, the risk of attacks 
would increase to a 6.3x10-6, in a given year.  The researchers assume that this level of 
risk will be constant over the next five years.  Therefore the risk of attack over a five-year 
period is 7.88x10-6 for one attack, and 3.15x10-5 for four attacks.  Assuming that the 
implemented security measure at NPS reduce the chance of an attack in a five year period 
by 30 percent, the change in risk ( )D∆  of attack equals 9.46x10-6. 
 
 
                                                 
39  “Homeland Security Advisory System,” Threats and Protection, 12 March 2002, 
<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29> [30 November 2003]. 
40  Elise Labott and Associated Press, “Terrorism Now Key Business Risk,” 24 August 2003, 
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/08/19/global.terror.biz/> [30 November 2003]. 
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G. MODEL AND RESULTS 
Our cost-benefit analysis model reveals the value of associated benefits for the 
incremental cost of increased security.  Benefits include saved lives and prevented 
property damage, while incremental costs were solely opportunity costs. 
Total Cost (@ 1.9 percent discount rate) = $17,160,000 
Total Cost (@ 10 percent discount rate) = $13,760,000 
Risk  x Total Benefits = (9.46x10( D∆ ) -6) x $192,000,000 
or 
$1 of Cost (@ 1.9 percent discount rate) yields $.00011 of Benefit 
$1 of Cost (@ 10 percent discount rate) yields $.00013 of Benefit 
From the analysis, it is obvious that there is essentially no benefit gained from the 
increased security since 9/11.  This result is primarily the product of minimal risk of 
attack, before or after the September 11 terrorist attacks.  With the threat near zero, any 
increased cost of security yields vastly diminished returns or benefits, and the use of 
different discount rates to calculate opportunity cost proved inconsequential.  Based on 
the total cost at a 1.9 percent discount rate, pre-security risk would have to be over 2800 
times our estimated worst-case risk to justify the cost to achieve the current benefits.  
Even then, it is only $1 of cost for $1 of benefit. 
The benefit of security and force protection is unquestionable.  The issue is at 
what cost.  Heightened security measures at NPS were obviously enacted without a clear 
assessment of the risk or opportunity costs.  The school is receiving a tiny benefit, at a 
very high cost.  As ‘transformation’ efforts are made throughout DoD to institute more 
business-like practices, serious thought and effort must be made to ensure the benefits of 
























The researchers made various considerations and assumptions throughout the 
entire analysis process.  In each instance, the effort was made to maintain the most 
conservative approach, thereby preventing unjustifiable conclusions. 
Several benefit values were considered undeterminable by the researchers.  There 
is no doubt that any bomb would create damage beyond the intended target, but accessing 
the magnitude of the collateral damage was beyond the available means of the 
researchers.  Additional benefits of uncertain value included the amount of labor to install 
a computer network in a new academic building and the administrative effort to relocate 
activities that had previously been performed in a targeted building. 
Despite these omitted figures, the total value of benefits is dominated by value of 
life.  Although numerous studies take differing approaches concerning how to assign a 
dollar figure to a life, most methods reach a value between $3 million and $5 million.  
The calculated figure in this analysis falls comfortably within the acceptable range.  
Additionally, it is not likely for the $167 million total value of life to increase 
substantially.  Following the theme of worst-case scenario, we assumed the targeted 
academic building would be attacked during peak usage.  Although we did not include 
possible students in computer labs or lounges, NPS is near 90 percent capacity for 
students, so the building population is considered to be as dense as possible. 
There are two considerations that would decrease the number of lost lives, thereby 
lowering the benefit of saved lives.  First, if a car bomb were detonated outside the eighty 
foot restricted area, the effect on the academic building would be greatly diminished.  
Secondly, as the Navy increases the availability of distance learning through NPS, it is 
possible that the total number of students in Monterey could decrease. 
Intangible costs were also left undetermined, but they do exist.  Both students and 
professors limit the number of trips to NPS due to gate delays and parking.  For students, 
the cost is a lessened academic experience.  They may consider the effort to get on base 
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too great and forego studying at the library or group meetings.  As previously stated, 
professors have less professional interaction, decreasing the intellectual capital at NPS. 
The surprising discovery on the cost side of the equation was that annual budget 
numbers for security were decreasing.  Although there had been a two-year influx of 
funds under the heading of “counter terrorism,” the portion allotted to physical security 
simply accelerated previously approved projects.  An NPS budgeter stated a future 
possibility to decrease the budget was to disband NPS security and contract it out to local 
law enforcement; only gate security would be continued.  Despite the efforts to increase 
fiscal responsibility, opportunity cost proved to be the real expense. 
The most difficult factor to calculate was risk.  Although Chief Baity and Special 
Agent Van Cleef agreed that the threat of a terrorist attack was low, neither would 
venture a quantitative possibility.  It was clear that targets other than military buildings 
within the United States had to be considered.  Again, the researchers attempted to 
maintain a conservative approach by determining the number of targets susceptible to 
similar attack.  This method eliminated millions of miles of roads, hundreds of thousands 
of miles of pipelines and rail track, and millions of annual travelers and commuters 
(planes, trains, and automobiles).  With no good way of assigning varying degrees of 
probability of attack, the researchers assumed each target to have an equal chance of 
being struck. 
Although the assumed 30 percent reduction in threat of attack may seem arbitrary, 
the researchers had little guidance for a more valid number.  However, the nearly 
insignificant initial risk was so low that the magnitude of reduction in risk was 
inconsequential.  The risk factor proved to be the most critical, and debatable, factor.  As 
calculated, barring any major changes in risk, the benefits of increased security are not 
even close to justifying the incremental costs.  Attempts can be made to prevent every 
possible means of attack.  For example, CAPT Simeral stated that fuel trucks for the base 
gas station are now escorted by security.  But as the marginal returns rapidly decrease, a 




Opportunity cost must be addressed to reduce cost although it is rarely 
considered.  The researchers are not security experts and have attempted to avoid 
comment on the effectiveness of the increased security measures.  Despite our lack of 
expertise in security matters, it is evident they create a high opportunity cost that equates 
to lost dollars.  Measures should be implemented with consideration of the costs, even 
though direction on security is dictated from the CNO down through the chain of 
command.  At NPS, gate delays create the most significant opportunity cost.  Since 
certain parking lots have been designated for car pool vehicles, one possible solution is a 
gate for shared rides only.  Another possibility is to distribute class hours more evenly 
through the day to limit congestion at gates during peak times. 
Another means to reduce cost to students, faculty and staff is remove the ‘no 
parking’ areas that surround campus buildings, until mandated by the national chain of 
command.  This would save over $260,000 in opportunity costs, as well as opening 
nearly 400 parking spaces on base.  As there are currently no physical boundaries to 
prevent a vehicle from entering the restricted area around a building, and cars are 
routinely checked at the gates, there would be no more risk than there is now of an attack. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The researchers have several recommendations for future study.  First, this project 
focused on the worst-case scenario--a bomb attack against an academic building.  
However, the costs of the increased security do not merely reduce the threat of a terrorist 
attack.  As stated by Chief Baity, theft is the most likely crime to be perpetrated at NPS, 
and the restricted parking around academic buildings is a major deterrent.  Prior to this 
particular security measure, computer components could simply be carried out an exit 
into an awaiting car.  Now, the thief must transport the stolen equipment across an open 
area, increasing the risk of being caught. 
To compare the costs and benefits of various physical security measures and 
crimes, the researchers recommend an Activity Based Costing project.  Determine the 
total costs of security at NPS and the risk of the top ten most likely criminal activities on 
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base.  Designate proportional values of security expenditures used for the prevention of 
these ten crimes.  This study will yield a breakdown of the security focus and the cost-
benefit of those measures. 
Next, our analysis was restricted to physical security.  The researchers 
recommend a cost-benefit analysis of IT security at NPS.  This recommendation was 
spurred by several events and discoveries.  First, current news continually reminds us of 
the vulnerability of computer systems.  The threat of a virus or worm is a constant 
concern, while hackers and foreign nations gain increasing ability to probe most systems.  
Second, a large portion of counter terrorism funds was used for IT security, which is a 
decision that seems to illustrate the primary security concerns.  Third, during numerous 
interviews for this project, the researchers were repeatedly asked if our analysis would 
include IT security.  It became very apparent IT security was an issue many people 
believed significant. 
Research into the effects and unintended consequences of security measures could 
be undertaken.  The security measures in this project were looked at from an economic 
standpoint, but not for effectiveness.  For example, in addition to the opportunity costs of 
a no-parking zone surrounding a building, there is the issue of what that boundary 
accomplishes.  If there is a physical boundary that prevents vehicle transit, then there may 
be a reduced risk of vehicle bombs approaching.  If there were no boundary, simply a no 
parking zone, then there would be a relative certainty of a terrorist driving up to a 
building unimpeded by cars that would ordinarily have parked there.  This is particularly 
amplified if a no parking zone is not enforced, enforced with nothing more than parking 
tickets, or selectively enforced for contractors or administrators.  In that case the benefit 
of raised suspicion when a vehicle is in the no parking zone decreases.  Much as the 
deterrence of theft is a positive unintended consequence, there could be severe negative 
consequences. 
Finally, a cost analysis of several other security measures could be undertaken.  
While a number of activities are undertaken, there may be a better, more cost-effective, 
means to accomplish them, such as routine security patrols on base.  Parking patrols and 
security patrols currently take place in light trucks or medium to large sized sedans.  
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Given the low rate of crimes on base, there could be a car used for prisoner transport that 
is kept on-call at the police station, while golf carts or other economical vehicles could be 
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APPENDIX A.  BUILDING CONTENTS 
FURNITURE   Quantity Value 
Desks $             13,800 138  $         100  
Chairs $             21,900 876  $          25  
Books $             69,000 138  $         500  
  $           104,700    
IT USER     
Laptop 
Computers  $            45,000 30  $      1,500  
Desktop Computers    
Offices $           165,600 138  $      1,200  
Labs $             93,500 85  $      1,100  
Classes $             22,000 20  $      1,100  
Printers $             10,000 5  $      2,000  
   $          336,100    
IT CORE     
Servers $        1,500,000 60  $    25,000  
UPS $           100,000 1  $  100,000  
MAINFRAME $        5,000,000 1 $5,000,000 
  $        6,600,000    
OTHER     
Copiers  $              8,000 4  $      2,000  
Projectors $             62,500 25  $      2,500  
Plasma Screens $             15,000 3  $      5,000  
  $             85,500    
      
SUB-TOTAL $        7,126,300    
BUILDING $      17,731,115    
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APPENDIX B.  BASE POLICE EXPENDITURES 
  FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04* 
Non-Labor   $        65,748 $        87,544 $      175,583  $        23,000 
Contracts   $        16,158 $      112,394  $   2,823,753  $          6,000 
Labor   $      671,312 $      751,737 $      632,000  $      717,000 
Total  $      751,000**  $      753,218 $      951,675 $   3,631,336  $      746,000 
      
Non-Labor: Supplies, maintenance, training    
Contracts: Leased Vehicles, Counter Terrorism   
Labor: Civilian Security Force (constant 14 individuals)   
* Estimated      
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APPENDIX C.  MAJOR SECURITY PROJECTS 
Upgrade Security Lighting/Sidewalks   $   227,068 
SCIF Remaining work, IT 
work   $   168,612 
Improve Gate Security/9/10th St.   $   175,000 
Unclassified Educational Network  $   696,695 
Program Management Support to ITACS  $     53,000 
Keying system, Electronic   $     49,980 
Perimeter Road, Parking Lots     $   662,662 
Replace Existing Power Panel   $     15,567 
Materials (CT)    $     10,102 
Materials (EOC)   $     30,297 
Provide A/C to additional rooms, bldg 
330  $     35,000 
Labor (PW shops before changeover) plus 6/14 $       1,855 
        
Designs      
  Upgrade Security Lighting, Sidewalks $     36,031 
  Perimeter Road/Parking Lot   $     97,881 
  
Perimeter Fence/Improve 9/10th St. Gate 
Security $     54,412 
        
S3 Network Security Group Contract  $   194,708 
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APPENDIX D.  AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS 
 Number % Of Total Average Annual Earnings 
Students 144541 54.73% $   79,724.4042 
Military Staff 17443 6.59% $   70,000.00 
Civilian Employees 102144 38.67% $   80,000.00 
Total 2640 100.00%  
Weighted Average   $   79,190.06 
Weighted Hourly Average   $   41.24 / hr 
 
                                                 
41  “NPS,” NPS Current Residential Enrollment Reports, <http://www.nps.navy.mil/ofcinst/sob/sob20041.xls> 
[28 November 2003]. 
42  “2003 Military Pay,” Defense Finance and Accounting Service Military Pay Rates, 12 June 2003, 
<http://www.dfas.mil/money/milpay/pay/2003paytable.pdf> [30 November 2003]. 
43  Zander, Laura, <lazander@nps.navy.mil> “Staff Data,” [E-mail to Gill McCarthy <dkmccart@nps.navy.mil>] 
13 November 2003. 
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APPENDIX E.  PARKING SPACES BY PARKING LOT 






   











A Herrmann Hall, 
front 
95 66 - 1 - 9 Reserved 
A1 Upper Tennis 
Courts  
15 - 20 - - Permit only 
A2  The Old Maze site  111 150 - - - open 
B  Herrmann Hall, 
west  
45 - 42 2 13 Permit Only 
C  Chapel  39 4 - 4 - Handicap only 
D  Bldg 222, east  63 12 - 5 - open 
E  Bldg 221, west  30 - - - - CLOSED 
F  New Post Office  12 33 - 2 - open, short-term 
     (24 min.) 
G  New Gym  25 22 - 2 - open 
H  BEQ  21 - *21 - - *Resident only 
I  Lake Tennis 
Courts  
9 30 - - - Unpaved 
J  Ingersoll/Halligan  38 - 13 1 - Permit only 
K  Boiler Plant, north  103 104 - - 1 open 
K1  Bldg 203, north  13 14 - - - open 
K2  Bldg 203, NW  7 12 - - - open 
K3  Boiler Plant, east  42 41 - - - open, 1 Gov't 
vehicle 
L  Glasgow Hall, 
north  
177 192 - 2 - open 
L1  Overflow, 
Glasgow  
- 54 - - - unpaved 
L2  Overflow, B224  - 45 - - - unpaved 
M1  Criscuolo Hall, 
north  
- 50 - - - unpaved 
M2  Criscuolo Hall, 
NW  
7 14 - - - unpaved 
N  Bldg 203  - 50 - 1 - unpaved 
O  Bldg 203, south  160 160 - 1 10 open  
P  Boiler Plant, south  88 86 - - - open 
Q Library, east  67 - 31 3 9 Permit only 
Q1  Ingersoll/Library  59 - 31 - - Permit only 
R  Halligan/ME Bldg  189 - 95 6 26 Permit only 
S  Spanagel Hall, 
east  
48 - 43 4 - Permit only 
T  NEX, south  56 33 - 4 - open 
T1  NEX, east  74 86 - - - open 
T2  NEX, west  14 - - - - CLOSED 
T3  Gas Station  32 27 - - - open 
U  Ballfield, south  11 11 - - - open 
U1  Ballfield, leftfield  20 10 - - - open 
V  Trans'n Yard, 
North  
45 87 - 2 3 open 
W  10th Street Gate  25 25 - - - open 
X  Trans'n yard/ 
     Morse Dr  
20 16 - - - open 
Y  Lot A-2/Morse Dr  11 14 - - - unpaved 
Z  Public Works  - 29 - 2 - open, partially 
     unpaved 
Z1  Ballfield, north  - 12 - - - unpaved 
  Dyer Road  9 - 7 - 8 Permit only 
  Meneken Loop  50 - 53 3 10 Permit only 
  Butler Road  18 13 - - - open 
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LOT Lot Location Prior Regular Permit No. Handicap No. Motorcycle Comments 
to 9-11 Spaces Spaces Spaces Spaces 
  Tisdale Road 5 - - 4 - Handicap only 
  Other Lots 
     (now closed)  
86 - - - - CLOSED 
        
Total 1939 1502 335 49 80  
    Current Total Spaces:                          1886   
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APPENDIX F.  OPPORTUNITY COST 
Increased Distance 4000 feet 
Speed  20 MPH 
   29.3 FT/Sec 
Time per person 136.4 sec 
Time/person/trip 272.7 sec 
Days per year 240 days 
Time/person/year 65454.5 sec 
   1090.9 min 
   18.2 hours 
% people affected 50%  
People coming on base 2640 people 
Total number affected 1320 people 
Total time/year 24000 hours 
Hourly earnings $                     41.24 per hour 
Driving Opportunity Cost  $              989,760    
    
Time spent at gate 7 min 
Days per year 240 days 
Time/person/year 1680 min 
   28.0 hours 
% people affected 50%  
People coming on base 2640 people 
Total number affected 1320 people 
Total time/year 36960 hours 
Hourly earnings $                     41.24 per hour 
Waiting Opportunity Cost  $           1,524,230    
    
Increased Distance 80 feet 
Speed  3 MPH 
   4.4 FT/Sec 
Time per person 18.2 sec 
Time/person/trip 36.4 sec 
Days per year 240 days 
Time/person/year 8727.3 sec 
   145.5 min 
   2.4 hours 
% people affected 100%  
People coming on base 2640 people 
Total number affected 2640 people 
Total time/year 6400 hours 
Hourly earnings $                     41.24 per hour 
Walking Opportunity Cost  $              263,936    
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APPENDIX G.  POSSIBLE TERRORISM TARGETS 
 
 Target Description   Quantity  
        
 Federal Buildings Owned 1,80045 
    Leased 6,50046 
 Dams*   76,00047 
 Drinking Water Systems 54,00048 
 Bridges   162,00049 
 Airports**  2,71450 
 Power Plantsª  9,35151 
 Major Military Bases° 25952 2,590 
 Major U.S. cities°° 24353 2,430 
     
   Total Targets 317,385 
      
* Greater then six feet in height   
** Paved runways greater than 1500 meters  
ª Fossil fuels, nuclear, and renewable   
° Assuming ten targets per base   
°° Population over 100,000, assuming ten targets per city 
 
 
                                                 
45  “Federal Buildings Expo 2002,” <http://www.federalbuildings.com/> [9 December 2003]. 
46  Ibid. 
47  “57 Dams in 16 States to be removed in 2003,” American Rivers, 19 August 2003, 
<http://amrivers.org/pressrelease/damremoval8.19.03.htm> [9 December 2003]. 
48  Ibid. 
49  “Bridges,” <http://www2.asce.org/reportcard/index.cfm?reaction=factsheet&page=2> [9 December 2003]. 
50  “United States Transportation,” 2003, <http://www.nationmaster.com/country/us/Transportation> [9 
December 2003]. 
51  “Existing Capacity and Planned Capacity Additions at U.S. Electric Utilities by Energy Source, 2000,” 
Electricity, 4 September 2002, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ipp/html1/t1p01.html> [9 December 2003]. 
52  “The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure,” April 1998, 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/98dodbrac.pdf> [9 December 2003]. 
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